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This paper  studies imitation in price and quantity markets. We analyse the results of two experiments designed with 
different information settings. The analysis shows that information is used differently and has diverse effects according 
to the market under investigation.   
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Whenever possible, individuals tend to mimic the choices of more successful agents. In 
market models, imitation theory, (see, among others, Schlag, 1998, Vega-Redondo, 1997) 
suggests different equilibrium selection processes according to how imitation behaviour 
is modelled and what information is available for players.  For example, if agents operate 
in one market and observe (and imitate) the successful actions of their direct rivals, then 
imitation will lead to the selection of the Walrasian equilibrium (Vega-Redondo’s 
theory). By the same token, if  players receive feedback information on the average 
industry-wide profit (Karandikar et. al., 1998), imitation may lead markets to become 
collusive over time (aspiration rules). To date, there are several experimental papers 
testing the different theories (see C. Altavilla et al. 2006, for references). In a recent 
paper (J. Apesteguia, et al. 2006), a general framework to study imitation in markets is 
developed and tested in Cournot games. Their main finding is that  informational signals 
are a key-factor in explaining the different effects of imitation. In this paper we take a 
different perspective. Our main hypothesis is that imitative behaviour may differ 
according to the market model under investigation. In other words, comparing Cournot 
and Bertrand markets we may observe different effects of the same informational signals, 
due to the specific structure of the market game
1. We report data from two market 
experiments; in each experiment we consider two different information structures and 
matching protocols. In the first setting, players are located in the same market throughout 
the session and they only observe prices/quantities and payoffs of their own market (fixed 
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1 The existence of differences in behaviour and equilibrium convergence between price and quantity 
games has already been explored in the experimental literature: see J. Potters, et. al.  (2006). 2
matching and partial information setting, FM, hereafter).   In the second setting, players 
are randomly allocated to different markets in each period; in this context, they have 
access to the statistics of all existing markets, including their own (random matching and 
complete information setting, RM, hereafter). The FM setting is compatible with Vega-
Redondo’s theory of imitation (“imitating your opponent’s best strategy”), whilst in the 
RM setting alternative rules are possible. As before, agents behaviour may respond to 
informational signals from their own market – using the previous imitation rule, or they 
may imitate “the best performer in all markets”, inducing a  more collusive market 
outcome
2. The evidence suggests three main conclusions. First, in both Bertrand and 
Cournot  market games, there is only a small difference between the two informational 
settings, i.e., the speed of the fall in prices and profits is similar in the two settings in 
Cournot and, for Bertrand markets, is only very slightly greater in the FM setting than in 
the alternative design. Second, responsiveness to market information signals is game 
specific.  In Cournot markets, players are generally more responsive to signals than in the 
Bertrand games. Furthermore, in the latter model, individuals are more reluctant to 
decrease prices, even if such a strategy has proved to be beneficial to another player in 
the recent past. Third, the type of imitative behaviour also varies with the market game. 
Under quantity competition, players respond to signals coming from both their direct 
opponents and the overall ‘best market performers’. In the price competition setting, 
participants are significantly influenced only by differences in their payoffs and the 
profits accruing to the “best performers”.  
 
2 A similar rule can be found in J.Potters et al., (2002), where agents may adopt an imitation strategy 
defined as “follow the exemplary firm”. Under this imitation regime,  the authors prove that the process of  
equilibrium selection leads Cournot markets to become more collusive in the long run.  3
Experimental Design 
 
The experiments are based on two types of duopoly market models. In the first case of 
quantity competition, market demand and individual profits are represented by the 
functions: 
) ( j i i q q b a p ￿ + ￿ =
i i i q c p ) ( ￿ = ￿
The second case considers a model of price competition: 
) ( j i i p p q ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ =
i i i q c p ) ( ￿ = ￿
Table 1 reports the value of the demand coefficients in the two market models
3:
Table 1: Values of the Demand coefficients 
 



























Marginal cost were zero.  
Table 2 reports the corresponding values of equilibrium prices (quantities) and profits. 
The experiments were conducted in Siena (2002-2004) and the subjects were 
undergraduate and graduate students. Participants were paid according to their 
cumulative performance during the experiment (observed profits varied between 8 and 12 
Euro per subject). Each market game lasted 20 rounds. 
 
3 See C. Altavilla et al. (2006) for an illustration of the market models. 4





p q ￿ p q ￿
WALRAS  6  18 108  6  18 108 
NASH 8  16  128  9.6  14.4  138.2
JPM  12  12 144 12  12 144 
The number of participants varied between 20 and 22 – 84 subjects, in total - (10 or 11 
active markets per period), and the experiments consisted of four sessions: S1/RM: a 
Cournot game with 11 markets per day; S3/RM: a Bertrand game with 11 markets; 
S2/FM: a Cournot game with 10 markets, and , finally, S4/FM: a Bertrand game with 10 
markets per period.
4
Participants were informed on the value of the demand parameters and costs. 
Specifically, in each stage, they could choose a level of output (price) in the interval 0-24 
(only integer values) and, the maximum value of the aggregate output at which individual 
profits would be zero was clearly indicated on the computer screen. Instructions varied 
according to the information settings. 
 
Convergence  
We begin by considering the Bertrand markets. In S3/RM, mean prices settled in the 
interval 6.5-7;  whilst in S4/FM, prices settled in the Nash interval, ranging from 7.5 to 8, 
in the three final periods (Figure 1). Further insight on the individual behaviour is 
provided by the mean relative frequencies of the price strategies (for the last three 
periods) in the different equilibrium intervals. 
 
4 S1/RM lasted only 15 periods.  5



















In the S3/RM setting, the mean frequency of the Walrasian price p=6, was 30.3%, 
whilst the Nash choices (p=8) corresponded to 15.3% of the total; finally, Collusive 
prices (p=12) corresponded to only 1.5% of the total.  In the S4/FM context, however, 
the average frequencies of the Nash and collusive prices were significantly higher (20% 
and 6.7%, respectively) than under FM although the Walrasian strategy remained the 
most common (21.7%).  
Turning to Cournot, average quantities are higher in S1/RM than in the alternative 
context, converging to the value of 19 in the final period (Figure 2). In  S2/FM the 
average quantity converged to values closer to the Walrasian outcome in periods 18 
(q=18.4) and 19 (q=17.4), and then increased to q=19.8, in the final stage.  In S1/RM, the 
average frequencies (for periods 12-15) of the strategies in the interval 17< q <19  
corresponded to 68.3% of the total, while only the 5% of the total were in the Nash 
interval 13 < q < 15, no player chose strategies close the to Collusive equilibrium value 
of 12, and the average frequency of q > 19 corresponded to 26.7%.  
In S2/FM, though the average frequency of the strategies in the Nash interval was lower 
than in S1/RM (1.6%), the frequency of strategies in the Collusive interval of 11-13 was 6
of 11.7% of the total. Strategies in the Walrasian interval 17-19 corresponded to 38.4%, 
whilst the average frequency  of  q > 19 corresponded to 48.3%. 





















What use did players make of all information available in S1/RM and S3/RM? In order 
to analyse the imitative behaviour in these contexts where alternative rules are possible, 
we studied the determinants of participants’ strategy changes. Specifically, we estimated 
a random effects probit model of the following form: 
 
(1)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 , 2 , 3 1 , 1 max, 2 1 , 1 , 1 1 , , Pr ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ = ￿ t i t i t i t t i t j t i t i S S ob ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Where i subscripts refer to individuals, j to the direct opponent and t the period. S 
stands for strategy, ￿ for profits (with  1 max, ￿ t ￿ indicating the profits of “the best 
performer in all markets” in the previous period), ￿ and ￿ parameters (along with the 
variance of the random effects) to estimate and ￿ the standard normal distribution. Our 
model allows three types of behavioural response: an “imitate the opponent” rule, an 
“imitate the best performer in all markets” rule and a basic reinforcement rule, given by 
the change in the individual’s profits over the two previous periods.  The first two 7
columns of Table 3 report the results from separate estimations of the Bertrand and 
Cournot RM games, whilst the third column reports the estimated difference in 
coefficients from a model estimated conjointly. 
 
Table 3: Imitation in RM market games, Random Effects Probit model.  
 Model  estimated 
Explanatory variable Bertrand Cournot 
Bertrand & Cournot –


























LR test of random 
effects 
27.7*** 5.9*** 33.2*** 
n 396 286 682 
Note:  The table reports marginal changes evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable (with jacknife 
standard errors in brackets). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  Coefficients and standard errors are all multiplied by 100. 
 
Examining Table 3, we can see that imitative behaviour is much less pronounced in 
Bertrand than in Cournot markets: in fact, the coefficients are smaller and less frequently 
statistically significant in the price game than in the quantity game. Moreover, the 
difference between the two experiments is statistically significant for both imitation 
variables. In the Cournot game, individuals change their strategies in response of both 
signals, whilst in the Bertrand game, players react only to the industrial signal. Finally, 
the effect of the reinforcement rule on the dependent variable is not statistically 




In common with previous work, our results confirm that players are more reluctant to 
change prices than quantities. In terms of imitative behaviour, players in Bertrand 8
markets are generally less responsive to informational signals; they don’t respond to the 
strategic behaviour of their direct opponent, and their reaction to the ‘best market 
performer’ is around half as strong as in Cournot markets. The implication of our analysis 
is that much more attention should be paid to the nature and rules of the strategic context 
we are exploring when studying imitation behaviour. Focussing only on the relative 
effects of  alternative informational structures may be misleading, if  the games specific 
structures are not carefully taken into account.     
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